

10 December 1958

Need for the NIS

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I. Essential Features of the Program

Fundamental basic research
One package deal
Logic of a single coordinated program

II. Wartime Need

NSCID No. 3 (NIA No. 1)
Stemming from WW II experience

Quote:

"Our experience in this war has effectively proved that if the United States is to have the necessary basic intelligence available for early planning of possible operations, it is essential that such intelligence be collected, collated, published, and distributed--i.e., ready to use--prior to the beginning of hostilities."

III. Cold War Need

No time in crisis to do fundamental research.
Example, Arthur D. Little report from ICA
Intelligence support for Korea, Indochina, Suez, Lebanon.

IV. Standard Intelligence Reference

Prime mission -- instant availability of NIS
Also needed -- all-source authoritative reference
Usefulness of NIS increasing

[Questionnaire of notes and statistics]

V. NIS Requirements

25X1X7

Ad hoc committee review of [REDACTED]
NIS Committee continuing refinement of requirements
3rd revision NIS Standard Instructions
Requirements in NIS are basic - not current
Sociological, Political, Economic

VI. NIS Production Situation

[Discussion from chart]

VII. Basic Intelligence Alternatives

Patience, persistence, and discipline

Alternative to NIS	- departmental
uncoordinated	- costly
duplication	- confusing
belated	- low priority

NIS Program

Successful - efficient
Insurance in crisis or war
Standard reference work
Inventory collection guide

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Need for the NIS

1. The NIS program is a fundamental intelligence operation of comprehensive basic research, as necessary a foundation of intelligence as basic research is of science. The NIS program does not of itself create requirements, but incorporates in one package the separate and combined requirements of the several intelligence agencies. In lieu of the NIS, these requirements would have to be fulfilled by the agencies themselves -- and usually on a crash basis after the need became urgent. The logic of such a single coordinated program stems from:

- a) the elimination of unnecessary duplication and deficiency of effort, if left to the agencies themselves;
- b) the refinement of intelligence requirements to meet both national and departmental objectives;
- and c) the consistent, planned development of comprehensive collection, collation, and production of basic intelligence in the interest of national security.

2. Wartime Need. The NIS was formally created by the National Security Council in its Intelligence Directive No. 3. As a point of fact, the NIS first appeared in the National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 1 which gives some indication of the importance which that Authority attached to developing a sound basic intelligence program. The lessons of World War II were still clear and impressive to the framers of the NIS program. They recognized the need for basic intelligence because they knew what a price we had to pay to get hold of it during a hot war. In his war report written in 1945 to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, wrote:

"Our experience in this war has effectively proved that if the United States is to have the necessary basic intelligence available for early planning of possible operations, it is essential that such intelligence be collected, collated, published, and distributed -- i. e., ready to use -- prior to the beginning of hostilities."

3. Cold War Need. The need for comprehensive basic intelligence in the post war period, the "Cold War," has been increasing with each new crisis. There is frequently neither time nor opportunity to do fundamental research of the kind that we have in the NIS, many sections of which may require one or more years to produce. Nor is there any other program into which can be fitted the thousands of bits and pieces

that together form a complete picture. For example, the NIS Committee works with such agencies as the ICA to ensure that one hand of the Government does know what the other hand doeth. Through the offices of the ICA, the Egyptian Government engaged a group of American consulting engineers, the Arthur D. Little Co. of Boston, to survey the transportation systems of Egypt. These surveys were made available to the Army who turned them over to the Transportation Corps Intelligence Agency. Its staff compiled a list of over 200 questions which were answered in a special briefing of the engineers who made the original surveys. The final product together with all other sources became NIS Sections 31, 32, and 33 on Egypt. These sections were published in time to give immediate and needed intelligence support at the onset of the Suez crisis.

25X1X7

25X1X7


Similar demand for basic intelligence in the NIS occurred during the Korean War, the Indochina situation, and the recent Lebanon affair. As far as we can ascertain, the NIS adequately fulfilled its purpose in every case to the extent of its availability.

4. Standard Intelligence Reference

The prime mission of the NIS is clear -- availability of comprehensive basic intelligence for immediate use both in Washington and at all of the far-flung military commands and foreign service posts in times of crisis, when time itself is of the essence. But with the growing complexity of Government it is also increasingly necessary that we possess an all-source authoritative intelligence reference to provide common understanding of officials and staffs on a world-wide basis. It is easy enough to say that these officials and staffs in Washington and in the field should rely on libraries to obtain such information when they need it. Even when there is considerable literature on a specific country and topic, the sources are varied and frequently contradictory. More to the point, there are few sources of critical appraisal in terms of national security requirements, on such matters as vulnerability appraisals, strengths and weaknesses of a government and its armed forces, psychological warfare aspects of its peoples. The field needs to have the kinds of knowledge that the experts in Washington have at their fingertips. Even in Washington, the Pentagon needs to be aware of the knowledge in State's intelligence files on a regular and continuing basis, and vice versa.

The top policy people can get their experts assembled on a specific problem, but there are not enough experts to satisfy all who need to know on the variety of day-by-day problems. The NIS does serve this purpose to the extent of its coverage. There is no other intelligence medium that does the job. In consequence, we find in recent surveys a marked increase in dependence of the intelligence community, other government agencies, and the field in the NIS.

[Questionnaire quotes and statistics]

5. Requirements. The original NIS intelligence requirements were formulated by the ad hoc committee appointed by the DCI to develop the NIS program. This ad hoc committee examined all previous and existing  basic intelligence publications and found they included not only geographic and transportation aspects

25X1X7 of a country, but the sociological, political, and economic aspects as well.



The NIS Committee and its working subcommittees are continually re-examining the NIS requirements to ensure that they are a) still required, b) reflecting communitywide needs, and c) within the existing capabilities of the contributing agencies. The NIS Standard Instructions containing the NIS requirements have undergone three major revisions in the past decade to eliminate unnecessary requirements, to add new requirements, such as those relating to psychological warfare and communism, and to refine other requirements.

The NIS evaluates the fundamental sociological, political, and economic aspects of a country in terms of the fundamental situations. So long as the fundamental political system continues in Country X, for example, it is not in the province of basic intelligence to delineate the current political ebb and flow. On the other hand, fundamental changes in the constitutional system, foreign policy, or leadership, would necessitate maintenance production as soon as the direction and extent of the fundamental changes were generally appreciated.

6. NIS Production Situation.

discuss with chart.

7. Basic Intelligence Alternatives. Historically, basic intelligence has been done after the fact. Usually, it has no pressing requirement that forces action. It has no glitter or glamor. It is hard work for which one can anticipate neither glory nor recognition. In consequence, it takes patience, persistence and discipline to develop comprehensive basic intelligence on a world-wide basis. The alternative to the NIS program is uncoordinated departmental programs, essentially duplicative, and therefore costly; non-integrated, and thereby confusing in their divergent viewpoints; intermittent and belated coverage because of low priorities. The NIS program is the most successful and sound development of comprehensive basic intelligence ever accomplished by this Government. It is certainly the most efficient method yet devised to accomplish this job. It is insurance that in times of crisis or war we will have the essential intelligence immediately available for use. It is the standard reference of basic intelligence on a world-wide basis. At the same time it provides a comprehensive running inventory of our intelligence gaps and deficiencies to continuously guide selective collection effort.